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ABSTRACT: Following the global recession period of 2009, much debate has been cast on the 
role of tax policy in improving economic growth in the South African economy. In our paper, 
we estimate optimal tax rates for South Africa using the optimization model of Scully (1996, 
2003) applied to quarterly data collected for periods before the crisis (i.e. 1994:Q1 – 2009:Q2) 
and for periods after the crisis (2009:Q2 – 2016:Q2). We estimate our optimization model using 
the autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) bounds test approach. Our empirical estimates 
reveal an insignificant relationship between taxation and economic growth for periods prior to 
the global recession period whereas we find a significant relationship for periods subsequent 
to the recession, with an optimal rate of tax being found to be 22 percent of GDP. These 
empirical results highlight that whilst tax policy had an insignificance effect on economic 
growth in South Africa before the recession of 2009, tax policy appears to play an important 
role in promoting short-run and long-run economic growth in the post-recession era. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that fiscal authorities should ensure that tax revenue as a share 
of GDP should do not exceed the optimal rate of 22 percent in the interest of attaining higher 
rates of economic growth.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The sub-prime crisis in the United States which led to the bankruptcy filing of the 
Lehman brothers in September 2008, sparked a worldwide financial crisis which has been 
labelled as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. The subsequent global 
recession period of 2009 forced most governments worldwide to increase government 
expenditure in order to boost economic growth recovery. However, many governments have 
not been able to raise enough revenue in order meet their demanding expenditure obligations 
and this has led to many economies acquiring large fiscal deficits. Euro countries can be 
referenced as an extreme case of such circumstances where excessive accumulation of debt 
levels eventually led to the European sovereign debt crisis of 2009. For the case of Africa, 
lingering budget deficits and poor fiscal management have been typical of governments since 
the 1980’s and South Africa is one of the few African countries which managed to attain a 
budget surplus in the post-2000 period. In particular, South African fiscal authorities 
maintained a budget surplus of 0.6 and 1 percent of GDP in the consecutive fiscal years of 
2005/2006 and 2006/2007, respectively. However, the budget has fallen back to a deficit in the 
post-recession period averaging 4.8 percent of GDP between 2010-2015 and this has resulted 
in government dramatically increasing it’s debt levels from 34.7 percent of GDP in 2010 to 
50.1 percent of GDP in 2015. Recently, the Davies Tax Committee (DTC) was formed and 
placed in charge of assessing South Africa’s tax policy in the post-recession period. Part of the 
committee’s mandate involves assessing the role in which tax policy supports important 
macroeconomic goals such as improved economic growth. It is therefore important for the 
committee to know how to maximize economic growth through the collection of taxation as a 
form of government revenue. It thus follows that the Committee’s main empirical interest 
should be with finding an optimal tax rate that would maximize economic growth gains or 
similarly minimize growth losses. 
 
The notion of an optimal tax rate has it’s theoretical roots embedded in the works of 
Laffer (1981) who hypothesized on government size being positively correlated with economic 
growth up to a certain critical point of which this relationship then turns adverse. Since then 
there has emerged a number of theoretical models which have hypothesized on a similar 
inverted U-shaped relationship between government size and economic growth and 
collectively these models are referred to as the BARS curve in commemoration of Barro 
(1990), Armey (1995), Rahn and Fox (1996) and Scully (1995, 1996, 2000, 2003). However, 
it was Scully (1995, 1996, 2000, 2003) who, in a series of papers, rationalized an empirical 
method of extracting a point estimate of the optimal tax rate which maximizes economic 
growth. A number of studies have followed in pursuit by applying Scully (1995, 1996, 2000, 
2003) framework to variety of industrialized and developing economies (see Chao and Grubel 
(1998) for Canada, Hill (2008) for the US, Keho (2010) for Ivory Coast and Forte and 
Magazzino (2011) for 27 EU countries). In addition to this list, there are two other empirical 
studies which have used Scully’s framework to estimate optimal tax rates for South African 
data. On one hand, Schoeman and van Heerden (2009) use non parametric estimation 
techniques and conventional cointegration analysis to obtain an optimal tax rate of 18 percent 
for South Africa using data collected from 1960 to 2009. On the other hand, Saibu (2015) uses 
linear and nonlinear transformations of Scully’s framework to estimate an optimal tax rate of 
15 percent for South African data collected over the period of 1964 and 2012. Apart from the 
issue of differences in methodological approaches, another possible cause for the discrepancies 
in empirical results can be attributed to the time periods used in both studies. Whilst the study 
of Schoeman and van Heerden (2009) strictly employs data collected prior to global 
recessionary period, Saibu’s (2015) study uses data which partially covers the post-
recessionary era. Based on this observation there would be very little reason to doubt that the 
dynamics of the optimal tax-growth relationship in South Africa have possibly changed from 
the pre-recession period to the post-recession period.  
 
In our study we complement the studies of Schoeman and van Heerden (2009) and 
Saibu (2015) by applying Scully’s tax-optimizing framework to two datasets, those being, one 
for the pre-recessionary period of 1994 to 2009 and the other for the post-recessionary period 
of 2009 to 2016. Note that the first sub-period relates to a period in which the Katz Commission 
was in charge of tax policy in South Africa throughout the post-Apartheid period up until the 
global recession period. The second sub-period is largely representative of tax policy under the 
Davies Tax Committee whose primary mandate centres on eradicating the adverse effects of 
the global recessionary period. Therefore, as a by-product of our empirical strategy we avoid 
any spurious regression problems that would arise from possible structural breaks associated 
with the recessionary period of 2009 and the shift in tax committees. Our choice of empirical 
framework for this study is the autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) model of Pesaran et. al. 
(2001) and this model presents a number of advantages over other competing cointegration 
frameworks. Firstly, the ARDL framework is well known for it’s ability to yield consistent 
long run regression coefficients and model asymptotically normal cointegration relations 
between a combination of I(0) and I(1) variables. Secondly, the model can perform quite well 
even with small samples which is a feature which will prove to be particularly useful when 
conducting our cointegration analysis on the smaller data associated with the second sub-
period. Lastly, both short-run and long-run coefficients of the ARDL model are estimated 
simultaneously without the loss of any long-run information.  
 
Having provided the background to the study, the rest of the manuscript is structured 
as follows. The next section of the paper provides an overview of developments in the South 
African tax system in South Africa. The third section of the paper provides a historical 
overview of tax policy in South Africa. The fourth section of the paper presents both the 
theoretical and empirical models used in the paper. The empirical data and estimation results 
are given in the fifth section of the paper whereas the paper is concluded in the sixth section of 
the paper in the form of policy implications and suggestions for future research. 
 
2 A historical overview of tax policy in South Africa 
 
Prior to South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, tax policy was designated 
under the authority of two tax commissions. The first was the Franszen Commission of 1970 
and this was later replaced by the Margo Commission in 1987. The Franszen Commission was 
established by the former Apartheid government with the purpose of inquiring into the South 
African tax and financial systems and also proposing recommendations regarding 
modifications to these systems which would promote economic growth. At the time 
government revenue collected was largely deployed on military spending in the interest of 
domestic security amidst heightened political unrest. The Franszen Commission raised 
concerns of the structure of South African tax system and warned of the dangers of increasing 
the already high personal tax burden. In particular the commission found that too much reliance 
was placed on raising revenue through direct taxes such that the share of direct taxation as a 
proportion of total tax revenue was significantly higher when compared to other industrialized 
economies (Schattil, 1969). Hence, the recommendations of the commission involved 
widening the indirect tax base as an avenue for increased tax collection. One of the major 
reforms undertaken by the commission involved replacing the sales duties with a 4 percent 
general sales tax (GST) and this resulted in a reduction in marginal personal income tax (Koch 
et. al., 2005). The Franszen Commission further recommended a shift in the South African 
income tax system from source-based to residence based. Their reasoning was that an 
increasing amount of income was beginning to flow into the country without being taxed. 
However, the recommendation of a residence-based tax system was rejected on the basis of the 
perceived complexity of implementing such a system. 
  
The Margo Commission replaced the Franszen Commission during a trying economic 
period whereby international sanctions had been placed on the economy, there was massive 
business disinvestment, fiscal government was facing a debt standstill, monetary authorities 
were faced with historically high levels of inflation, the country was experiencing increasing 
human capital flight and the world economy was generally in a deteriorating state (Black et. 
al., 2005). In face of these economic challenges, the Margo Commission was appointed to 
restructure the tax system by particularly broadening the base on both direct and indirect taxes. 
Between 1987 and 1994 the commission implemented a number of key reforms on direct and 
indirect taxes. Reforms on direct taxes included i) the enhancement of neutrality in personal 
income tax by allowing equal treatment of both genders, ii) the reduction in company tax to a 
35 percent, and iii) the introduction of a secondary tax on companies as a tax on distributed 
profits. On the other hand, reforms on indirect taxes included i) the replacement of the GST in 
favour of the invoice-based value-added tax (VAT) and ii) the introduction of the capital 
transfer tax as a replacement of the estate duty and donations tax. Despite these reforms, the 
share of individual taxation as a share of tax revenue increased from 32 to 40 percent between 
1987 and 1994 whereas the share of company tax in total revenue had reduced from 22 to 13 
percent over the same period of time. This was accompanied with negative economic growth 
rate averages of -0.7 percent experienced during the 1989 to 1993 period. 
   
Following the transition of the South African economy into a democratic republic in 
1994, the Government of National Unity implemented the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) and it’s offspring the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
policy as a means of correcting the social ills and imbalances suffered by disadvantages groups 
under the Apartheid regime. Part of the objectives of these policy programmes included the 
reduction of individual and corporate taxes while maintaining a stable tax-to-GDP ratio of 25 
percent. On this basis the Katz Commission was appointed and assigned the responsibility of 
broadening the tax base, reducing fiscal borrowing  pressures, improving tax base neutrality, 
improving tax administration and revenue collection all with the overall aim of improving 
economic performance (Koch et. al., 2005). Between 1994 and 1999, the Katz Commission 
released 9 interim reports and based on the recommendations of the commission the following 
tax reforms were implemented. These reforms included the introduction of the capital gains 
tax, tax on interest and other income of the retirement fund industry and VAT on gambling and 
financial services, as well as the change from a source-based income to a residence-based one 
(Greyling et. al., 2008). However, the most important reform instituted under the Katz 
Commission was the establishment of the South African Revenue Services (SARS) as an 
independent government department. This institutionalization of SARS as an autonomous 
revenue collection agency greatly enhanced administrative efficiency as well as revenue-
generating capacity (Bonga-Bonga and Perold, 2014). However, whilst job opportunities, 
lower inequality and improved investment were not achieved between 1994 and 1999 as part 
of GEAR outcomes, the economic growth rate increased from it’s negative base in 1990 to 
more than 4.1 percent in 2000 (Schoeman and van Heerden, 2009).  
 
Between 2000 and 2007, fiscal authorities had managed to reduce the share of 
individual taxation as a proportion of tax revenue from 42 percent to 30 percent whereas the 
share of company tax in total revenue had increased from 16 to 29 percent over the same period. 
This was accompanied with improving fiscal budget and economic growth even though such 
growth is unlikely to have been spurred by supply-side benefits associated with governments’ 
improved fiscal position (Koch et. al., 2005). Moreover, the GEAR policy programme was 
phased out and ultimately replaced with Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South 
Africa (ASGISA) programme in 2005, which envisioned halving unemployment to less than 
14 percent and attaining economic growth rate averages of 6 percent between 2010 and 2014. 
However, the sub-prime crisis of the US housing market in 2007 and the subsequent global 
recession period of 2009, brought about a decrease in economic growth, a decrease in total tax 
revenue collection and increased budget deficits, amongst a host of other adverse economic. In 
wake of these developments, the South African government has adopted three interrelated 
policy programmes; the National Development Plan, the New Growth Path (NGP) and the 
Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), in hope of encouraging economic development through 
improved job sustainability and the eradication of inequality by the year 2030. The Ministry of 
Finance particularly appointed the Davis Tax Committee in 2013 to access the compatibility 
of the South Africa’s tax policy in supporting the objectives of the policy programmes and a 
major part of the committee’s mandate is to limit government expenditure and boost revenue 
collection through tax reforms in order to fund key policy objectives such as infrastructure 
development (Phiri, 2016).  
 
3 Methodology of the study 
3.1 Scully’s tax optimizing growth model  
 
As previously mentioned, the theoretical model adopted in the paper is based on the 
optimizing model of Scully (1995, 1996, 2000 and 2003). The model particular assumes a 
balance budget approach in which government expenditure (G) is financed by the collection of 
tax revenue, τY (i.e. G = τY), where τ is the flat tax rate and Y is the national level of income. 
The remaining share of output, (1 – τ)Y, is used is used to produce goods and services for the 
private sector. It is assumed that both public and private goods are used to produce national 
output through the following constant returns endogenous Cobb Douglas production 
technology: 
 
𝑌𝑡
𝑌𝑡−1
⁄ = 1 + 𝑔 = (𝑡−1𝑌𝑡−1)
(1 − )(𝑌𝑡−1)
−1     (1) 
  
 Where the subscript t-1 denotes the previous periods and g represents the output growth 
rate. By log-linearizing equation (1) results in the following empirical regression used to 
estimation purposes: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑔) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔  +  𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑡−1) +  𝑙𝑜𝑔 [(1 − ) (𝑌𝑡−1)]    (2) 
 
 Where the term ‘log’ denotes the logarithmic transformation of the time series. In order 
to obtain the optimal tax rate which maximizes economic growth, equation (2) is differentiated 
with respect to the tax rate and setting the answer to zero i.e. 
 
𝜕 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑔)
𝜕⁄ = 
−1 + [(1 − )−1(−1) = 0    (3) 
 
 And re-arranging equation (3) we obtain: 
 

⁄ =

1 − ⁄           (4) 
 
 Whereas solving equation (4) for the optimal tax rate, *, yields: 
 
 ∗ =

 + ⁄           (5) 
  
Despite the simplicity of the model in deriving the optimal tax rate, Kennedy (2000) 
criticized this framework since it is an endogenous growth model which ignores the 
contribution of previous periods’ capital goods to output. In other words, the argument points 
out that Scully’s model requires a 100 percent depreciation rate on the capital stock seeing that 
capital is assumed to be entirely used up in the processes of annual production. In reality this 
condition could never hold. However, Scully (2000) was quick to respond to these criticisms 
by demonstrating that the contribution of previously-accumulated capital and technological 
change in the aggregate production function are implicitly captured by the presence of the 
lagged production term. He particularly does this by showing that including factor inputs in the 
production function will not change the optimal tax rate estimates. Henceforth Scully (2000) 
was able to defend the efficiency and integrity of the tax optimizing model against criticisms 
set forth by Kennedy (2000). 
 
3.2 The ARDL cointegration model 
 
We use the ARDL framework of Pesaran et. al. (2001) to model cointegration relations 
within the log-linearized version of Scully’s tax optimizing regression (i.e. equation (2)) and 
the quadratic variant of the model (i.e. equation (6)). The baseline ARDL specification for the 
log-linear regression (2) is given as: 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 = 0 + 𝑇0 + ∑ 1𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑡𝑎𝑥
𝑔𝑑𝑝
 𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 2𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣
𝑔𝑑𝑝
 𝑡−𝑖
+ ∑ 
3𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑖 + 1𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑡𝑎𝑥/𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−1 + 2𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣/𝑔𝑑𝑝1𝑡 + 
                           +3𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝1𝑡 + 𝑡       (8) 
 
Where 0 and T0 are the drift and trend components, respectively, 1, 2 and 3 are the 
short-run coefficients; 1, 2 and 3 are the long-run coefficients and t is a well behaved error 
term. The first step in the modelling process is to test for cointegration effects. Pesaran et. al. 
(2001) suggest testing the null hypothesis of no cointegration as: 
 
H0: 1 = 2 = 3 = 3 = 0        (9) 
  
 And this null is tested against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration effects i.e. 
  
H1: 1  2  3  3  0        (10) 
 
 The aforementioned hypotheses are tested using a F-test which is validated against 
lower and upper bound critical values (Pesaran et. al., 2001). Only if the F-statistic exceeds the 
upper bound of the critical values can the econometrician proceed to model error correction 
effects within the system of equations. The ARDL based unrestricted error correction model 
(UECM) of equation (8) is given as: 
 
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 = 0 + 𝑇0 + ∑ 1𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑡𝑎𝑥
𝑔𝑑𝑝
 𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 2𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣
𝑔𝑑𝑝
 𝑡−𝑖
+ ∑ 
3𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑖 + 1𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑡                                            (11) 
 
 Where ectt-1 is the error correction term that estimates the speed at which the variables 
return to their steady-state after an episode of disequilibrium to the system. The error correction 
terms is expected to be negative and significant. Moreover, it’s value should not exceed unity.  
 
4 Data and empirical results 
4.1 Data description and unit root tests 
 
The data used to carry out our empirical analysis consists of a quarterly series of two 
time series variables; namely, the real gross domestic product (rgdp) which proxies output 
growth and the ratio of tax revenues to GDP (tax/gdp) which is used to proxy the tax rate. The 
share of output used in the private sector (priv/gdp) is computed as the remnant portion of the 
share in output growth after deducting tax revenues i.e. priv/gdp = (1 – tax/gdp). All the time 
series data used in the study has been retrieved from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) 
online database over the period 1994:Q1 to 2016:Q2. As previously discussed, we split the data 
into two sub-samples; the first being covering the period 1994:Q1 to 2009:Q2 being 
representative of tax policy under the Katz Commission whilst the second sub-period covers 
2009:Q2 to 2016:Q4. However, before making an meaningful use of the data, we firstly tests 
the data for unit roots using a combination of first and second generation unit root testing 
procedures. Traditionally, the ADF and PP testing procedures are used for detecting the 
presence of possible stochastic trends in the time series variables but these unit root are 
commonly criticized on the premise of not being able to distinguish between unit root processes 
and close-to-unit root process. Consequentially, we supplement these tests with the DF-GLS 
unit root test of Elliot et. al. (1996) which is essentially an improvement over these first 
generation unit root tests by exerting a higher testing power when the root of the time series is 
close to unity. We perform all three unit root testing procedure on the levels and, were 
necessary, on the first differences of the time series variables for three time periods i.e. 
1994:Q1-2016:Q2; 1994:Q1-2009:Q2 and 2009:Q2-2016:Q2. The results of this empirical 
exercise are reported in Table 1 below.  
 
Table 1: Unit root tests results 
time series adf pp df-gls 
 intercept trend intercept trend intercept trend 
1994:Q1-
2016:Q2 
 
      
log(rgdp) -3.65*** 
 
-3.77** -43.37*** -46.01*** -2.62*** -3.13** 
log(tax/gdp) -6.55*** 
 
-8.58*** -69.90*** -78.26*** -6.47*** -8.25*** 
log(priv/gdp) -6.53*** 
 
-8.54*** -67.21*** -76.64*** -6.38*** -8.30*** 
1994:Q1-
2008:Q2 
 
      
log(rgdp) -2.81* 
 
-3.24* -29.59*** -34.13*** -1.74* -3.13** 
log(tax/gdp) -4.64*** 
 
-6.02*** -51.86*** -58.72*** -4.69*** -5.73*** 
log(priv/gdp) -4.45*** 
 
-5.73*** -49.88*** -58.00*** -4.49*** -5.51*** 
2008:Q2 – 
2016:Q2 
 
      
log(rgdp) -2.57 
(-4.12)*** 
-2.80 
(-4.10)** 
-17.84*** -18.06*** -2.57** -2.63* 
log(tax/gdp) -6.40*** 
 
-7.83*** -23.50*** -23.18*** -6.35*** -7.57*** 
log(priv/gdp) -6.33*** 
 
-7.58*** -23.91*** -23.72*** -6.35*** -7.44*** 
Notes: Significance levels: ‘***”, ‘**’, ‘*’ denote the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
 The unit roots test results, regardless of whether performed with a constant or a trend, 
show that for the full sample (i.e. 1994:Q1-2016:Q2) and the first sub-sample (i.e. 2008:Q2-
2016:Q2) the test statistics reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at a significance level of at 
least 10 percent for all the observed time series. Collectively, these results show that all 
variables, in the full and first sub-sample, are levels stationary, I(0) processes. However, for 
the second sub-sample (i.e. 2008:Q2-2016:Q2), our results become mixed. We particularly find 
that whilst all unit root test statistics reject the unit root null for the tax/gdp and priv/gdp 
variables at all levels of significance, for the case of the rgdp time series, the ADF statistics fail 
to reject the unit root null at all significance levels. Only after differencing the series once do 
the ADF statistics fail to detect unit roots in the variables. This provides evidence of the rgdp 
variable being an I(1) time series. Under the traditional Engle-Granger theorem none of the 
sub-samples would qualify for cointegration since the full and first sub-sample strictly consists 
of I(0) variables whilst the second sub-sample contains a mixture of I(0) and I(1) time series. 
Fortunately, none of this is not much of a concern in our study, since the ARDL presents the 
advantage of being able to model cointegration relations between a mixture of time series 
which are integrated of an order less than I(2). Hence we model cointegration relations among 
the observed time series. 
  
4.2 ARDL cointegration results 
 
Having tested for units root among the time series and confirming that the variables are 
not integrated of an order higher than one, we proceed to apply the bounds cointegrationn test 
to the variable. The Schwarz-Bayesian (SBC) was employed to determine the appropriate lag 
length for the three period samples under observation. For all samples the appropriate model is 
the ARDL(1,0,0) specification. Table 1 below presents the cointegration tests results for the 
three period samples. 
 
  
Table 2: Bounds test results for cointegration effects 
 F-statistic 95% 
upper bound 
95% 
lower bound 
90% 
upper bound 
90% 
lower bound 
      
1994:Q1-
2016:Q2 
 
9.11 5.06 6.09 4.26 5.21 
1994:Q1-
2008:Q2 
 
6.96 5.16 6.28 4.34 5.31 
2008:Q2 – 
2016:Q2 
5.63 5.56 6.63 4.58 5.54 
 
Based on the F-statistics we find cointegration relations between the time series for all 
three sub-samples. In particular, we obtain F-statistics of 9.11 and 6.96 for the full and first 
samples, respectively, and both these statistics are above the 95 percent upper bound. 
Concerning the second sub-sample we report a F-statistic of 5.63 which lies between the upper 
and lower bound of the 95 percent critical level. By default this means that the statistic is 
inconclusive at the 95 significance level. However, we observe that the statistic lies above the 
90 percent upper bound hence validating cointegration at a 90 percent critical level. The overall 
confirmation of significant cointegration effects among the time series for all sample periods 
permits the estimation of the ARDL (1,0,0) regression and the modelling of the associated error 
correction effects. For empirical convenience, we begin by estimating the long-run ARDL 
coefficients for all sample periods and we reported the results in Table 3 below.  
 
  
Table 3: ARDL (1,0,0) Long-run regression coefficients 
 estimate standard error t-value p-value 
1994:Q1-2016:Q2 
 
intercept -93.82 79.33 -1.18 0.24 
trend 0.00 0.00 -0.93 0.36 
log(tax/gdp) 11.96 10.62 1.12 0.26 
log(priv/gdp) 41.26 34.23 1.20 0.23 
R2 0.34 - - - 
DW 1.92 - - - 
* 22.47%/(N/A) - - - 
1994:Q1-2008:Q2 
 
intercept 82.21 88.31 0.93 0.36 
trend 0.00 0.00 1.46 0.15 
log(tax/gdp) -11.20 0.01 1.46 0.33 
log(priv/gdp) -35.44 11.43 -0.98 0.36 
R2 0.37 - - - 
DW 1.87 - - - 
* N/A - - - 
2008:Q2 – 2016:Q2 
 
intercept -551.39 21.846 -2.52 0.02* 
trend -0.01 0.01 -0.76 0.46 
log(tax/gdp) 76.13 30.69 2.48 0.02* 
log(priv/gdp) 237.52 93.71 2.53 0.01** 
R2 0.36    
DW 1.93    
* 24.27%    
Notes: Significance levels: ‘***”, ‘**’, ‘*’ denote the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. DW represents the test statistics from 
the Durbin Watson test and all three statistics detect no evidence of serial correlation in the regressions.  
 
As can be observed from Table 3, the estimation of the first sub-period and the full 
sample produces negative and insignificant estimates on the coefficients of the ‘tax/gdp’ and 
‘priv/gdp’ variables. We therefore cannot calculate an optimal tax rate for these two sample 
periods since Scully’s model specifically requires that regression coefficients must be both 
positive and significant in order to have an optimal point. Interpretively, this shows that tax 
policy administered under the Katz Tax Commission had an insignificant effect on economic 
growth from the time of the democratic elections liberation in 1994 up until the global recession 
period of 2008. For the case of the data for the first sub-period and the full sample, we find 
correct positive and significant coefficients on the ‘tax/gdp’ and ‘priv/gdp’ variables. From 
these estimates we are able to compute the optimal tax rates of 22.47 for the full sample and 
24.27 percent for the second sub-sample. We note that both of these figures are quite different 
from the optimal tax rates of 15 and 18 percent previously presented in the studies of Saibu 
(2015) and Schoeman and van Heerden (2009), respectively. We attribute these discrepancies 
in optimal tax estimates to the exclusion of pre-Apartheid data in our study, which otherwise 
would have produced a downward bias in the estimated optimal tax rate since tax reforms in 
post-democracy period reflects the non-discriminatory nature of the new South Africa.  
 
 Having estimated the ARDL long-run regressions for the 3 sample periods, we now 
investigate short-run and long-run interrelationships by estimating the ARDL-based UECM 
models for the sample periods. The obtained results are recorded in Table 4. In referring to 
these results, we find insignificant short-run estimates for all short-run coefficients in the full 
and first sub-samples. However, for the second sub-sample we obtain positive and significant 
short-run estimates on both the ‘tax/gdp’ and ‘priv/gdp’ variables hence providing evidence of 
both short-run and long-run interrelations between taxes and economic growth for South Africa 
in the post-recession period. Similar short-run effects between taxes and economic growth have 
been documented in the studies of Tomljanovich (2004), Lee and Gordon (2005) and Ojede 
and Yamarik (2012). Concerning the error correction terms, we obtain negative and significant 
estimates of -0.49 for both the first and the full samples whilst obtaining a significant estimate 
of -0.60 for the second sample period. These estimates imply that in the post-recession period 
60 percent of disequilibrium from the long-run steady state is corrected in every quarter 
whereas for the pre-recessionary period and the full sample, 49 percent of deviations from the 
steady state are corrected in each quarter. This demonstrates that equilibrium correcting 
behaviour in the post-recession period is much quicker in comparison to the other sample 
periods. Our results ultimately prove that tax policy in the post-recession period has been quite 
effective in ensuring that the share of tax revenues in economic growth has been moving along 
a steady-state growth path. 
 
  
Table 4: ARDL-based ECM estimates 
 estimate standard error t-value p-value 
1994:Q1-2016:Q2 
 
trend 0.00 0.00 -0.93 0.36 
log(tax/gdp) 11.96 10.62 1.13 0.26 
log(priv/gdp) 41.26 34.43 1.20 0.23 
ect t-1 -0.49 0.09 -5.40 0.00*** 
R2  0.26 - - - 
DW 1.92 - - - 
F-statistic 7.49 - - 0.00*** 
1994:Q1-2008:Q2  
 
trend 0.00 0.00 1.46 0.15 
log(tax/gdp) -11.20 11.43 -0.98 0.33 
log(priv/gdp) -35.44 38.60 -0.92 0.36 
ect t-1 -0.49 0.12 -4.20 0.00*** 
R2  0.29 - - - 
DW 1.90 - - - 
F-statistic 5.29 - - 0.00*** 
2008:Q2 – 2016:Q2 
 
trend -0.01 0.01 -0.76 0.46 
log(tax/gdp) 76.13 30.69 2.48 0.02* 
log(priv/gdp) 237.52 93.71 2.53 0.01** 
ect t-1 -0.60 0.16 -3.72 0.00*** 
R2  0.44 - - - 
DW 1.93 - - - 
F-statistic 5.17 - - 0.00*** 
Notes: Significance levels: ‘***”, ‘**’, ‘*’ denote the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. DW represents the test statistics from 
the Durbin Watson test and all three statistics detect no evidence of serial correlation in the regressions.  
 
As a final step in our empirical analysis, we check the residuals from all estimated ARDL 
regressions for autocorrelation, functionality and normality. All performed diagnostic tests are 
administered through the LM-type statistics and the results of the tests are reported in Table 5 
below. As can be observed from the diagnostic test results, all the residuals from the estimated 
regressions for the 3 sample periods show no signs of serial correlation and are found to be 
stable as well as normally distributed. As noted by Schoeman and van Heerden (2009), such 
results satisfy the assumptions of the classical normal linear regression.  
 
 
 
Table 5: Diagnostic tests on ARDL regression residuals 
test type  LM test statistic 
 1994:Q1-2016:Q2 1994:Q1-2008:Q2 2008:Q2 – 2016:Q2 
autocorrelation 7.34 
(0.84) 
14.44 
(0.27) 
0.01 
(0.92) 
functional form 0.04 
(0.84) 
0.98 
(0.32) 
0.31 
(0.58) 
normality 3.94 
(0.14) 
0.30 
(0.86) 
0.17 
(0.68) 
Notes: p-values reported in parentheses.  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
Following the democratic elections of 1994, the South African government has been 
burdened with the responsibility of eradicating the lingering social ills of the previous 
Apartheid regime through increased government spending and this has been accompanied with 
need for increased collection of tax revenue. Further adding to government’s woes has been 
the recent global recession period of 2009 which saw economies worldwide experience sharp 
declines in economic growth rates and fiscal authorities have been once again delegated the 
responsibility of ensuring that economic growth returns to a positive long-run equilibrium 
steady state path in the post-recession period. Conventional tax-growth theory hypothesizes on 
a positive tax-growth relationship up to a certain optimal level of which this relationship turns 
negative afterwards. In our study we put this theory to the test for the case of South Africa by 
applying the ARDL bounds test approach of Pesaran et. al. (2001) to the tax optimizing growth 
model of Scully (1996, 2003) for sample time periods before and after the global recession 
period. Our empirical results reveal a non-existent relationship between tax revenue and 
economic growth for periods prior to the recession whereas this relationship turns significant 
in the post-recession period. 
 
Overall, the empirical results from our study reveal a number of interesting 
phenomenon. For one, the insignificant relationship found between tax revenue and economic 
growth in the pre-recession period highlights the ineffectiveness of tax policy on economic 
growth under the Katz Tax Commission. In particular, our empirical results demonstrate the 
incompatibility of previous tax policy with three former macroeconomic policy programmes 
(i.e. the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and it’s predecessors the Growth 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) and Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative of South 
Africa (ASGISA) policies) in promoting economic growth in the country. The overall 
effectiveness of fiscal policy in affecting economic growth under these macroeconomic 
programmes are a reflection of poor policy co-ordination and implementation methods used. 
Another implication drawn from our study is that fiscal policy implemented subsequent to the 
global recession period has exerted a positive effect on economic growth and this is mainly 
attributed to the successful recommendations of the Davies Tax Committee in keeping revenue 
collections on par with the long-term economic growth objectives as outlined in the recently 
adopted New Growth Path (NGP) programme. As a natural development to this study, future 
research should focus on determining the optimal tax structure for South African tax authorities 
under the Davies Tax Committee administration.   
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